

B.G.A. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

TECHNICAL NEWSHEET

TNS 11/12/86

PART 1 AIRWORTHINESS "AGGRO"

This is the last B.G.A. Technical Newsheet for 1986, the contents of which will be transcribed to the 1987 B.G.A. Compendium of Airworthiness Directives, Mandatory Modifications and Special Inspections.

- 1.1. Astir CS Locking of the tailplane (Ball & Socket type). 5 cases have been reported by the Gliding Federation of Australia of the tailplane lock plunger (spring loaded) failing to fully re-engage with the ball. G.F.A. have made a modification mandatory.

A serious accident reported by RAF Germany was caused by the winch cable parachute becoming entangled with and unlocking and removing the tailplane. RAFGSA have made mandatory a modification to secure the tailplane lock, (copy herewith).

- 1.2. Ka8/18 Elevator hinge-pin not secured by welding. On a new replacement elevator one of the hinge pins came adrift because the head had never been secured by welding it to the hinge bracket. Could apply to many similar types. (Reported by Aquila G.C.).

- 1.3. Janus CM Propeller mounting Failure of one strut. LBA AD/85-164 requires inspection and replacement as detailed in Tech. Note. 809-1 from Southern Sailplanes (0488 71774).

- 1.4. Hoffman H36 Dimona CAA emergency AD 008-09-86 (copy herewith) is self explanatory and imposes limitations.

- 1.5. Grob 109b (Flutter) CAA Airworthiness Directive 012-11-86 (herewith) varies the application of LBA A/D 85-218-2, and imposes restrictions. Modifications must now be complied with by 31.12.87. Grob TM 817-20 refers.

- 1.6. Fournier RF3 and RF6 CAA revised list of Foreign Airworthiness Directives (issue 6) is enclosed herewith.

- 1.7. Continental O-200 and O-240 Bogus Starter Parts Gasil 10/86 extract (herewith) may apply to Rolleson Condor tugs?

- 1.8. Citabria (Tug) Undercarriage hinge bolt failure, almost resulted in serious damage. All critical bolts should be inspected and replaced as necessary. (Ulster G.C.) Applies also to PA-18 Cubs and PA-25 Pawnees etc.

- 1.9. Jantar 1 Rudder hinges (wooden) may be replaced in metal. Contact London Sailplanes.

- 1.10. Jantars Corrosion of rudder cables in polyamid conduits. Tech Bulletin BE-027/86 from Anglo Polish Sailplanes, requires inspection.

- 1.11. Puchatz Bulletin BK 32/50-3/86 requires bolts in wheel hubs, to be replaced in steel.

- 1.12. "Autoflug" type harnesses may not hold under high deceleration loads if special springs are not incorporated, to keep the adjusting jamming bars in contact with the webbing. (Derek Piggott, (Lasham), has supplies of springs).

- 1.13. SZD 51-1 "Junior"

a) Service Bulletin BK-002/85 applies to serial No's X-116, X-232, and B. 1495-1503 inclusive, introduces Aileron Mass Balancing to prevent flutter.

b) Service Bulletin BK 003/85 introduces strengthened push-rod at the Speed Brake Handle. Applies to serial No's X-132, B. 1496-1503 and B.1615/1616.

Details from Anglo Polish Sailplanes (0628/39690)

- 1.14 Oxygen Charging Personal injury by fire has been reported, when escaping oxygen ignited either spontaneously, in contact with oil impregnated clothing or due to "STATIC" (Reported by Yorkshire G.C.).
- 1.15 Weight & Balance Inspectors are reminded of the requirement in B.G.A. Technical Procedure Manual (Para 7.9) that "realistic data for the type are contained in C of A documents and on placards". Significantly adverse shift of the c.g. is likely to arise when sizeable repairs (or modifications) are incorporated aft of the c.g. datum. The B.G.A. weighing proforma (diagramatic) is available from the B.G.A. office. Flight manuals (where available) give all essential weight balance, levelling and ballast data.
- 1.16 Cable Parachutes continue to cause serious accidents to gliders, and the simple solution is to lengthen the STROP. The Van Gelder winch at London G.C. Dunstable has 100 ft. of rope between the Tost rings and the parachute. Will Club Technical/Safety Officers please action this advice?
- 1.17. LS3 Upper Air Brake Paddle fouls the airbrake control rod bolt. Between 1-2 mm clearance should be obtained by cutting away the paddle. Reported by A. Tribe. RAF Germany G.C.

PART 2 GENERAL MATTERS

- 2.1. New Type Certificates by B.G.A. SZD 51-1 Junior, incorporating modifications listed in B.G.A./TNS/9/10/86 which have been acknowledged by the manufacturer. The minimum cockpit weight is to be not less than 128 lbs.
- 2.2. Bocian Undercarriage Bungees Anglo-Polish Sailplanes advise that they have stocks of these (0628-39690).
- 2.3. Stamo Pistons Eddy Room, Wolds Gliding Club, Pocklington, may be able to assist with the supply of these unique pistons, specially ordered from Germany.
- 2.4. Nimbus 2B Increase in Gross Weight. T/Note 286-22 increases the max-weight to 580 kgs/1278 lbs, provided the max weight of non-lifting parts does not exceed 250 kg./551 lbs. Cs of A should be annotated for this increase, and placards amended accordingly.
- 2.5. Accident Summaries The following are attached for display on Club Notice Boards:-
- a) AIB Summary Hoffman Dimona. - Elevator Drive?
 - b) AIB " Janus CM - Undershot
 - c) AIB " Grob 109 B - Heavy landing
 - d) AIB " Grob 109 B - Ditching
- 2.6. B.G.A. Inspector Renewal fees (£15.00) which include your personal indemnity in respect of "certain activities and responsibilities directly in connection with airworthiness certification", are now overdue. Please remit to B.G.A. office a.s.a.p. The new list will be compiled in January 1987!

A VERY SPLENDID XMAS AND A HAPPY NEW YEAR
TO ALL OUR READERS

R.B. STRATTON
CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER.

No: 9/86

Ref: 1b

Aircraft type and registration: Grob G109B G-WAVE

No & Type of engines: 1 Grob 2500 E1 piston engine

Year of Manufacture: 1985

Date and time (UTC): 26 July 1986 at 1221 hrs

Location: LND VOR, 247° Radial, 20.5 nm DME

Type of flight: Private (pleasure)

Persons on board: Crew — 1 Passengers — 1

Injuries: Crew — None Passengers — None

Nature of damage: Minimal damage on ditching, slight damage to propeller cowling, wheel spats, wing and tailplane during salvage

Commander's Licence: Self Launching Motor Glider Private Pilot's Licence

Commander's Age: 49 years

Commander's Total Flying Experience: 109 hours fixed wing light aircraft (of which 77 were on type)
675 hours gliding experience

Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot and AIB examination of the aircraft.

The aircraft had taken-off from the airfield at St Mary's, Isles of Scilly, following which it climbed to 2500 feet amsl overhead before setting course for the Lands End VOR beacon. The over-water time was estimated by the pilot to be 16 minutes and when approximately half way across, having just advised air traffic control at St Mary's of his position, a total loss of engine power occurred. As Lands End was not yet in view the pilot elected to return to the Islands, which were clearly in sight, and advised St Mary's ATC of the situation and his intentions.

With the propeller windmilling, the pilot attempted to re-start the engine, but without success. At a height of approximately 200 feet, a final ditching call was transmitted, the aircraft was turned into wind, the systems were shut down and the propeller was feathered prior to ditching. A soft water contact was achieved at a "ground" speed estimated to have been 25 knots, with the aircraft remaining upright and settling only slightly in the water. The pilot and passenger, who were wearing life jackets, were rescued by a helicopter from RNAS Culdrose and the aircraft was towed to St Mary's harbour by the local lifeboat. The weather at the time was reported as wind 290°/10—15 knots, temperature +18°C, cloud 5 oktas at 3000 feet.

Subsequently, the aircraft fuselage was transferred to the AIB facility at RAE Farnborough where a detailed examination of the engine and its systems were carried out. No pre-impact abnormalities were discovered until the ignition system was examined. This revealed that partial breakdown of the coil and condenser of the Slick type 4230 magneto had occurred, a fault that could not readily be attributed to the salt water contamination generally present throughout the engine. During a post accident test, the magneto ran for 12 minutes before spark failure occurred



No: 10/86

Ref: 1b

Aircraft type and registration: Hoffman H-36 Dimona D-KAFH

No & Type of engines: 1 Limbach L2000 EB IC piston engine

Year of Manufacture: 1983

Date and time (UTC): 12 August 1985

Location: North Connell Aerodrome, Nr Oban, Scotland

Type of flight: Private

Persons on board: Crew — 1 Passengers — 1

Injuries: Crew — None Passengers — None

Nature of damage: Broken landing gear and propeller

Commander's Licence: Not known

Commander's Age: Not known


Commander's Total Flying Experience: Not known

Information Source: Technical report provided by West German Accident Investigation Authorities

On approach to land the aircraft suffered loss of elevator response resulting in a heavy landing. Permission was given for the aircraft to be returned to Germany for repair and an investigation was undertaken by the German authorities.

No technical defect was found and it is believed that during the accident flight the elevator had not been correctly attached to the push-rod in the vertical fin at its disassembly point. The elevator actuating mechanism is designed to engage automatically when the tailplane is assembled onto the fin but it was found that it was in fact possible to attach the tailplane without engaging the elevator control.

The aircraft manufacturer amended the flight manual for the aircraft to augment the controls checks and the Civil Aviation Authority issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (No 010-08-85) on this subject.



Elevator Controls in vertical Fin

No: 10/86

Ref: 1b

Aircraft type and registration: Schempp-Hirth Janus CM G-BMBJ

No & Type of engines: 1 Rotax 535A piston engine

Year of Manufacture: 1985

Date and time (UTC): 20 July 1986 at 1715 hrs

Location: Enstone Airfield, Oxfordshire

Type of flight: Private (pleasure)

Persons on board: Crew — 1 Passengers — 1

Injuries: Crew — None Passengers — None

Nature of damage: Substantial to the rear fuselage, minor to the left wing tip

Commander's Licence: Private Pilot's Licence

Commander's Age: 48 years


Commander's Total Flying Experience: 60 hours (of which 5 were on type)

Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot and AIB telephone enquiry

The Janus CM is a high performance sailplane powered by a small engine mounted on top of the fuselage. When the engine is not required during flight it can be retracted rearwards into the top of the fuselage.

After a normal motor launched take-off and 45 minute flight, the aircraft returned to the field, with the engine retracted, for a glide approach and landing on runway 26. The wind was reported as 300°/05 knots. The aircraft was allowed to drift too far downwind, resulting in a low approach and early touchdown in the vicinity of a field of barley located south of the tarmac runway threshold.

The left wing tip went into the barley and the aircraft swung to the left and into the field. The aircraft received substantial damage to the rear fuselage and minor damage to the wing tip. The pilot was wearing full upper torso restraint and was uninjured.





BGA/TNS/12/86

**ROYAL AIR FORCE
GLIDING AND SOARING ASSOCIATION**

Ordnance Board Room 1605, Empress State Building
Lillie Road, London SW6 1TR

Telephone:
01-385 1244 Ext 2724

RAFGSA DEM(G)/6

See Distribution

14 November 1986

ADVANCED NOTIFICATION OF TECHNOTE ASTIR/9 - TAILPLANE ATTACHMENT LOCKING

INTRODUCTION

1. A serious Astir CS accident has been attributed to the in-flight operation of the tailplane release lever. The accident occurred following a launch failure where the winch cable drogue chute draped over the tailplane/fin leading edge and operated the release lever. This Technote introduces a modified lever assembly to prevent inadvertent release of the tailplane.

APPLICATION

2. This modification is to be carried out on all RAFGSA Astir CS gliders before their next flight.

EMBODIEMENT

3. The existing lever assembly (Figure 1) is to be replaced with the modified assembly (Figure 2) supplied by the RAFGSA Centre.

4. Glider Tailplane Derigging/Rigging. Tailplane derigging is achieved by unscrewing the lever release bolt, removing the lever assembly and screwing in the derigging tool (Figure 3). Following derigging, the lever assembly is to be reinstalled to prevent its loss/damage.

WARNING Particular care is to be taken on all subsequent tailplane riggings to ensure that the parts of the lever assembly are correctly assembled prior to installation.

RECORDING ACTION

5. Record completion of this instruction in Section 5 and 6 of the glider RAFGSA Form 3935.

demlet



FOURNIER RF3 SERIES MOTOR GLIDERS AND FOURNIER RF6 SERIES AIRCRAFT

CAA AD No Description Applicability - Compliance - Requirement

Associated Material

PART 1 - BUREAU VERITAS AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

67-39-1

Wing Skin - Inspection for cracks and deterioration of glued joints.

Applicable to all RF3 Series aircraft. INSPECT the critical zone every 30 flight hours until modified in accordance with Service Bulletin Alpvavia No 2.

79-234

Fuselage - Modification to the

Applicable to all RF6B-100 aircraft.

79-234

Fuselage - Modification to the fireproof bulkhead - Inspection of a seal supporting plate.

Applicable to all RF6B-100 aircraft. Compliance required as detailed in AD. Fournier Aviation Service Bulletin No 3 also refers.

79-235

Flight Controls - Inspection and

Applicable to all RF6B-100 aircraft.

79-235

Flight Controls - Inspection and replacement of aileron control coupling rod.

Applicable to all RF6B-100 aircraft. Compliance required as detailed in AD. Fournier Aviation Service Bulletin No 2 also refers.

86-31

Aircraft Structure and Flight

86-31

Aircraft Structure and Flight Controls - Inspection for corrosion of metal parts.

Applicable to all RF6B-100 and RF6B-120 aircraft. Compliance required as detailed in AD. Fournier circular dated 10.01.1986 also refers.

General Aviation Safety Information

Safety Data and Analysis Unit
Brabazon House
Redhill Surrey RH1 1SQ
Telephone Redhill 65966
Telex 27100 Telegrams & Cables Bordaair Redhill



BCA/TNS/12/86
10/86

ROLLESON CONDORS etc.

17th October 1986

1. SUSPECT BOGUS STARTER CLUTCH


E

Aircraft : Socata Rallye (Applicable to other aircraft)
Date : June 1986
Engine : Continental O-200 (and O-240)

The starter and clutch assembly were removed after only a few hours of operation because of a failure to start. It was found that the clutch had failed. It did not contain a part number or a serial number and was also of a different design from the genuine aircraft part. The sprag clutch cage had cracked. There is a possibility of metal particles getting into the engine oil system which could lead to more serious (and expensive) problems. The part number of the genuine part is 639153/641500.

Bogus

Genuine



CAA Comment:

All maintenance personnel should be alert for these bogus parts. If any are found please report to the SDAU.

The records used to compile this document include information reported to the CAA, information obtained from CAA investigations and deductions by CAA staff based on the available information. The authenticity of the contents or the absence of errors and omissions cannot be guaranteed.

Photo-copying this leaflet is permitted and short extracts can be published provided that the source is duly acknowledged.

In order to identify the broad subject matter each item is classified as follows:

Operational items mostly of interest to pilots

Airworthiness items mainly for engineers

Items which involve both operational and airworthiness interests

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P/E

Civil Aviation Authority
 Brabazon House
 Redhill
 Surrey RH1 1SQ
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 Telex 27100 Telegrams & Cables Bordair Redhill



Airworthiness Division
 9/97/CtAw/119

26 September 1986

CAA EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 008-09-86
 HOFFMANN H36 DIMONA
 FLIGHT LIMITATIONS

NIC	SE
1 OCT 1986	

APPLICABILITY

Hoffmann H36 Dimona all Serial Numbers.

BACKGROUND

Structural failure of one example in flight. LBA issued LTA (AD) 86-177 prohibiting further flight. AD 86-177/2 now allows further flight following inspection and placarding with new flight limitations.

ASSOCIATED MATERIAL

LBA AD 86-177/2 dated 22 September 1986 copy attached.

DESCRIPTION

This Directive varies the requirements of the LBA AD 86-177/2.

COMPLIANCE

Before further flight carry out the requirements of this Directive.

REQUIREMENT

Carry out action in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the LBA AD 86-177/2. Compliance with paragraph 3 may be accomplished with an additional placard next to the ASI stating in red on a durable material :-

- DO NOT EXCEED (Vne) 180 km/h (97 kts)
- DO NOT EXCEED 147 km/h (79 kts) IN ROUGH AIR.
- ABOVE 147 km/h (79 kts) DO NOT MOVE CONTROLS ABRUPTLY
 DO NOT USE LARGE CONTROL DEFLECTIONS.

Any queries regarding this Directive should be referred to the General Aviation Section at the above address.

DISTRIBUTION

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BGA/TXS/12/86

HAPPY NEW YEAR!

11/86


21 November 1986

1. WINTER

P/E

With monotonous and too-frequent regularity, winter comes around again, bringing with it the usual problems. Pilots can refresh their memories by reading Safety Sense Leaflet No 3, Winter Flying.

Below are a few items to illustrate certain points, the second one was in Gasil 3/86, but we are repeating it due to its serious nature and the availability of further information.



2. Engine stopped in icing conditions

P

Aircraft : Cessna 441 Conquest
 Date : January 1986
 Engine : Garrett TPE331

- TURBINE!!!

The aircraft was flying at flight level 45 in cloud in moderate icing with all anti-icing and de-icing equipment switched on. The aircraft broke cloud at 400 ft on the approach. Once clear of cloud and in sight of the runway, the anti-icing equipment was selected off. Just before touchdown the left hand engine failed.

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Items which involve both operational and airworthiness interests

P
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B.G.A. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

TECHNICAL NEWSHEET

TNS 9/10/86

PART 1 AIRWORTHINESS "AGGRO" (Please add to the 1986 Pink Pages)

- 1.1. I.S. 30 Undercarriage Collapse, following structural failure. The attached sketch is self-explanatory. Repair scheme from U.K. Agents.
- 1.2. M.200 Rudder detached The attached sketch indicates areas for DAILY INSPECTION following a failure at Northumbria G.C.
- 1.3. Ka7 Fatigue failure of the "V" bracket. Supporting the speed-brake lever, in the wing root, results in partial assymmetric deployment of the brakes (similar failures reported on Kal3s). (Enstone Eagles G.C.).
- 1.4. JANUS C.M. Mandatory Modifications Fuel system Tech-Note 809-3 (from U.K. agents) requires fuel pumps to be piped in parallel.
- 1.5. LS6 Flutter (leading to one case of abandoning the aircraft), has been notified to owners and LBA mandatory speed restriction of 108 knots has been imposed. Modifications to reduce the backlash in the flaps are required. (Notified to owners).
- 1.6. Centrair 101 "Pegasus" series - "Aileron Oscillations" French A/D T.86-129, places constraints on the use of water-ballast, and requires modifications to centrair BS N 101-7 before March 1987. (Notified by BGA to owners 20.8.86).
- 1.7. FAUVETTE Failure of the pivot supporting pilot's airbrake lever in the cockpit. Brittle brazing failed. (Reported by P.F. Woodcock).
- 1.8. T.65 'VEGA' Tailplane/Elevator flutter. The case reported in TNS 7/8/86 (1.3.) from R.A.F.G.S.A. (Germany), was caused by prior structural damage remaining undetected, from a previous incident. (Report from Slingsby Aircraft Ltd)
- 1.9. Grob 109 (A) Undercarriage Support Structure (below the seats). Cracks have been found in bracketry (partly embedded in G.R.P.) following heaving landing inspections. Could apply to early serial No. 109 (As). B.G.A. have discussed the problem with Grob. Anglia Sailplanes repair scheme has been approved.
- 1.10. SLICK MAGNETO's (applicable to Tugs & Motor-Gliders) The recent ditching of a Grob 109b has been confirmed as failure of the magneto (low time). After a short period of operation, total failure occurred, probably due to break-down of the H.T. Coil. (Mag was modified per B.G.A. TNS 7/8/86 (1.21)).
- 1.11. SLICK S.B. 2-80-A (herewith), gives magneto maintenance and overhaul schedules.
- 1.12. C.A.A. Foreign Airworthiness Directives (updated) in respect of:
 - a) RF 3, 4, 5 & 6
 - b) DG 400
 - c) Taifun 17E, are enclosed herewith
- 1.13. Extracts from C.A.A. General Aviation Safety Information Leaflets (G.A.S.I.L. 7/86) refer to:-
 - a) PA-18 (Cubs) Stabilator screw-jack failure
 - b) PA-18 (Cubs) Lift-strut fork-ends, cracked
 - c) Soccata Rallye - Tailplane Corrosion
 - d) Slick Magneto's

- e) Composites & fuels
- f) Bendix MAG switches

- 1.14 SZD 51-1 "Junior" Sailplane. B.G.A. Mandatory Mods Whereas this type is not yet formally type certificated in the U.K. by the B.G.A. Technical Committee, the following modifications will be required even for a "Permit to Fly":
- a) Cable Release circuit - outer cable from the instrument panel bulkhead to the belly hook to be secured.
 - b) Panel bulkhead to be reinforced, from behind.
 - c) Bungee hook to be removed
 - d) Canopy restraint straps to be more adequately secured.
 - e) Cable Release knob attachment at the panel cowl to be bolted, not screwed.
 - f) Drainage holes to be inserted (also for venting) in ailerons and rudder.
 - g) Trim control lever to be coloured GREEN.
 - h) Speed-brake lever to be coloured BLUE
(Notified to Anglo Polish Sailplanes 20.8.86).
- 1.15 TOST WEAK-LINK ASSEMBLIES The bolts attaching these assemblies must be free to rotate, if the links are to operate at the correct overload conditions. (Notified by H.Q. Air Cadets).
- 1.16 Grob 109 (A & B) Alternate Carb (Hot) Air Shutters Screws securing the "butterflies" of both boxes have been swallowed by the engine. Inspect a.s.a.p., and secure by "locktite" or peening. Hot air system jammed.

PART 2 GENERAL MATTERS

- 2.1. C.A.A. Light Aircraft Maintenance Schedules (LAMS Issue 2)
- In order that operators can more effectively comply with the 50/150/ Annual cycle, and more fully understand the details of the inspections required, proforma versions are available from the B.G.A. office (copy attached).
- 2.2. Long-Life Wooden Gliders We understand that an ex Air Cadet Glider, having exceeded 36 years and 45,000 launches, likewise exceeded its proof and ultimate load tests!
- 2.3. KA 13 Disabled Person's Manual Rudder Conversion kit, has been devised and tested by R.A.F.G.S.A. Marham. Contact Sgt. A. Raffan 617 Sqn., R.A.F. Marham, Kings Lynn, Norfolk.
- 2.4. IS 30 - Service Bulletin EO-2 increases the "Maximum Admitted Take-off Mass" from 590 kgs to 610 kgs. New Placards should be available from the U.K. Agents.
- 2.5. B.G.A. INSPECTOR RENEWALS 1986/87
- Inspector renewals become due October 1st 1986 (£15.00), and includes your personal liability insurance indemnity cover of £250,000 in respect of "activities and responsibilities directly in connection with airworthiness certification.

Please respond a.s.a.p. on the enclosed proforma.

B.B. STRATTON
CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER
23.9.1986
